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Abstract
Research assessment exercises have now become common evaluation tools in a num-
ber of countries. These exercises have the goal of guiding merit-based public funds
allocation, stimulating improvement of research productivity through competition and
assessing the impact of adopted research support policies. One case in point is Italy’s
most recent research assessment effort, VQR 2011-2014 (Research Quality Evalua-
tion), which, in addition to research institutions, also evaluated university departments,
and individuals in some cases (i.e., recently hired research staff and members of PhD
committees). However, the way an institution’s score was divided, according to VQR
rules, between its constituent departments or its staff members does not enjoy many
desirable properties well known from coalitional game theory (e.g., budget balance,
fairness, marginality). We propose, instead, an alternative score division rule that is
based on the notion of Shapley value, a well known solution concept in coalitional
game theory, which enjoys the desirable properties mentioned above. For a significant
test case (namely, Sapienza University of Rome, the largest university in Italy), we
present a detailed comparison of the scores obtained, for substructures and individuals,
by applying the official VQR rules, with those resulting from Shapley value compu-
tations. We show that there are significant differences in the resulting scores, making
room for improvements in the allocation rules used in research assessment exercises.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, national research evaluation exercises have been adopted by a grow-
ing number of countries, including Italy. Objectives of these exercises include guiding
merit-based public funds allocation, stimulating improvement of research productivity
through comparative analysis between research structures, identifying weaknesses and
strengths of a country’s research infrastructure, and assessing the impact of adopted
support policies Abramo & D’Angelo (2015). Research assessments are conducted in
a variety of ways, and methodologies in a given country may even vary from one itera-
tion to the next, based on accumulated experience, theoretical advancements, available
resources and policy aims Abramo et al. (2011). Italy’s most recent exercise, namely
VQR 2011-2014, was based on a hybrid approach (i.e., bibliometric indicators for hard
sciences and peer review for social sciences and humanities) and it evaluated a rel-
atively small selection of research products (two per researcher for universities, and
three per researcher for other institutions). We refer the reader to Section 2.1 for more
details.
While the focus of national assessment exercises remains primarily the evalua-
tion of entire research structures (i.e., universities or other research institutions), it has
been argued that the aims of these exercises could be compromised if internal redis-
tribution of government resources within each institution does not follow a consistent
logic Abramo & D’Angelo (2011). The original goal of VQR 2011-2014 was the eval-
uation of structures (e.g., universities) and (partially) substructures (e.g., departments),
however, its results have then been used for other assessments that more directly in-
volve individuals. As an example, the assessment of Ph.D. courses has included the
VQR performance of the members of the Ph.D. board1. A more recent use of the VQR
results has been in the selection of the so-called “Dipartimenti di Eccellenza” (Excel-
lent Departments)2. All these uses of the VQR results require that the credit allocation
for the publications is done in a fair way. However, the way research product scores are
currently used for these purposes yields evaluations that do not satisfy properties that
are, from a methodological perspective, highly desirable (e.g., budget balance, fairness,
marginality; see Section 3 for a detailed discussion).
The Shapley value Shapley (1953) is a well known solution concept in the context
of coalitional game theory, and evaluations based on this notion are known to enjoy
the desirable properties outlined above. While it can be shown that research evaluation
efforts, such as VQR 2011-2014, can be modelled as a coalitional game, exact Shapley
value computation remains a difficult problem, requiring time that is exponential in the
size of the input instance. This made its application to large universities, with thou-
sands of researchers, impractical. However, recent results have shown the feasibility
of computing very good approximations to the Shapley value even for such large input
instances (see Section 4 for an overview of these results).
1For more details, see (only available in Italian) http://www.anvur.org/index.php?option=
com_content&view=article&id=455&Itemid=481&lang=en
2For more details, see (only available in Italian) http://hubmiur.pubblica.istruzione.it/
web/universita/programmazione/dipartimenti-di-eccellenza
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1.1. Contributions
In this article, we consider the main division rules used for allocation games, where
there are indivisible goods and monetary compensation is possible. For these division
rules, we discuss the properties that are desirable when allocation games are employed
for modeling a national research evaluation process, such as the VQR 2011-2014 eval-
uation by the Italian Ministry of Education, Universities, and Research (MIUR).
We focus in particular on Sapienza University of Rome, the largest university in
Italy and one of the largest in Europe, covering almost all Italian research areas. For this
significant test case, we present a detailed comparison of the official research product
division rules used by MIUR with those resulting from Shapley value computations.
The comparison includes individual researchers, research groups, and substructures
(e.g., departments). Our findings highlight that there are significant differences in the
resulting scores, making room for possible methodological improvements in the ap-
proach currently used in Italian research evaluation exercises.
1.2. Structure of the article
Section 2 provides details about the Italian research assessment exercises and in-
troduces coalitional game theory, with an emphasis on the Shapley value. Section 3
models Italian research assessment exercises as an allocation game. It discusses divi-
sion rules and the properties that they should enjoy. Moreover, it compares the various
division rules according to their properties. Section 4 reports on the difficulties of
exact Shapley value computation, and on recent advances (e.g., approximation algo-
rithms, input simplification techniques) that make it possible to compute exact results
or at least good approximations even for large instances. Section 5 presents, for our
test case (namely, Sapienza University of Rome), a critical comparison of the scores
assigned to individual researchers, research groups and substructures (e.g., university
departments) according to the official VQR 2011-2014 rules, with those resulting from
Shapley value computations. Section 6 discusses related work, putting our article into
perspective. Finally, Section 7 presents some conclusions and outlines some future
research directions.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. The Italian VQR
VQR (Research Quality Evaluation) 2011-2014, the most recent Italian research
assessment effort was based on a hybrid evaluation approach. Evaluation of the so
called bibliometric areas (i.e., hard sciences) relied primarily on bibliometric analysis,
while non-bibliometric areas (i.e., social sciences and humanities) were subjected to a
peer review process.
VQR2011-2014 required every Italian research structure R recognized by the Ital-
ian Ministry of Education, University, and Research to select a subset of its research
products (which could be journal articles, conference papers, books, book chapters,
critical reviews, commentaries, book translations, patents, prototypes, exhibitions, works
of art, etc.) and submit them to an evaluation agency called ANVUR. While doing so,
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structure R was in competition with all other Italian research structures, as the out-
come of the evaluation was expected to guide the allocation of the merit-based share
of the core public funding to Italian research institutions (until the next evaluation is
performed). Every structure was therefore interested in selecting and submitting its
best research products.
The VQR program was articulated in two phases. During Phase 1, based on the
authors’ self-evaluations and on ANVUR guidelines, R selected and submitted to AN-
VUR (at most) the required number of research products for each one of its authors,
in such a way that each product was formally associated with exactly one author. The
number of products required for each author varied according to the type of research
institution. The default value was 2 for universities and 3 for other research struc-
tures, with exceptions in specific cases (e.g., recently hired personnel). During Phase
2 ANVUR formulated its independent quality judgment about the submitted research
products (the score assigned to each product is currently made known only to its au-
thors). The sum of the scores resulting from ANVUR’s evaluation was then taken as
the VQR score of R.
ANVUR published an evaluation of all departments, based on the product scores
(the score of each department was computed as the sum of the scores of the products
formally assigned to the authors in that department). The scores were also used for
evaluating new individual researchers hired byR (this also greatly influencedR’s funds
in subsequent years), as well as members of PhD committees. Scores for recently
hired researchers were computed as the sum of the scores of the products formally
assigned to them. Data in this respect were published by ANVUR in aggregated form
only for each department and for each scientific field. Evaluations for researchers that
are members of PhD committees have been computed as the sum of the scores of
the best publications each one of them had coauthored, among all the publications
submitted for the VQR (for this evaluation, the formal assignment of publications to
authors is irrelevant). Data in this respect were published by ANVUR in aggregated
form only for each PhD committee and was only accessible to PhD coordinators and
university officials. Another use of the VQR results, as already mentioned, was the
creation of a ranking of the departments with the goal of identifying “excellent” ones
and provide them with a significant extra funding. This ranking used the VQR scores
of the members of the department normalized with respect to the average grade of all
products in its scientific field (in Italy each professor is assigned to a unique scientific
field, called SSD).
VQR 2011-2014 followed in the wake of two previous national research evaluation
exercises. The first of these was VTR (Triennial Research Evaluation) 2001-2003. This
first research evaluation effort was based solely on a peer review process, and it required
each institution to submit a number of publications equal to 25% of its research staff
complement (a relatively small sample), in each of the 18 disciplinary areas considered.
VQR 2004-2010 and the more recent VQR 2011-2014 closely resembled one an-
other. The main differences were in the default number of products per researcher that
had to be submitted (3 for universities and 6 for other research institutions in VQR
2004-2010, which extended over a longer time interval than VQR 2011-2014) and in
the methodology for computing product scores based on bibliometric indicators. Both
VQRs used a combination of citation counts and journal impact factors, as they were
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derived from international databases such as Scopus and WoS, in order to rate articles
in bibliometric areas, resorting to informed peer review only in cases of significant
discrepancies between the two measures (e.g., highly cited articles in poorly-ranked
journals, or vice versa). However, the way these indicators were combined differed be-
tween the various versions of VQRs. We wish to stress that these details are immaterial
for our article, as we focus not on computing product scores, but on how such scores
are distributed among the respective authors (and their subsets).
2.2. Coalitional games
Coalitional games provide a rich mathematical framework to analyze interactions
between intelligent agents (see, e.g., Osborne & Rubinstein (1994)). We consider coali-
tional games of the form G = 〈N, v〉, consisting of a set N of n agents and a charac-
teristic function v. The latter maps each coalition C ⊆ N to the worth that agents in C
can obtain by collaborating with each other. In this context, the crucial problem is to
find a mechanism to allocate the worth v(N), i.e., the value of the grand coalitionN , in
a way that is fair for all players, and that satisfies some additional important properties
such as efficiency (i.e., distributing precisely the available budget v(N) to the players,
not more and not less). Moreover, for stability reasons, it is usually required that every
group of agents C gets at least the worth v(C) that it can guarantee to the game.
Several solution concepts have been considered in the literature as “fair allocation”
schemes and, among them, a prominent one is the Shapley value Shapley (1953). Ac-
cording to this notion, the worth of any agent i is determined by considering its actual
contribution to all possible coalitions of agents. More precisely, we consider the so-
called marginal contribution to any coalition C, that is, the difference between what
can be obtained when i collaborates with the agents in C and what can be obtained
without the contribution of i. More formally, the Shapley value of a player i ∈ N is
defined by the following weighted average of all such marginal contributions:
φi(G) =
∑
C⊆N\{i}
|C|!(n− |C| − 1)!
n!
(
v(C ∪ {i})− v(C)
)
.
Allocation games. Among the various classes of coalitional games, we focus in this ar-
ticle on allocation games, which is a setting for analyzing fair division problems where
monetary compensations are allowed and utilities are quasi-linear Moulin (1992). Al-
location games naturally arise in various application domains, ranging from house al-
location to room assignment and rent division, to (cooperative) scheduling and task al-
location, to protocols for wireless communication networks, and to queuing problems
(see, e.g., Greco & Scarcello (2014); Maniquet (2003); Mishra & Rangarajan (2007);
Moulin (1992); Iera et al. (2011) and the references therein).
Computing the Shapley value of such games is a difficult problem, indeed it is #P-
hard even if goods can only have two different possible values Greco et al. (2015). In
this article we focus on large instances of this problem, involving thousands of agents
and goods, for which no algorithm described in the literature is able to provide an exact
solution. Fortunately, several approximation algorithms and input instance simplifica-
tion techniques have been developed in recent years, that allow us to attack even such
large instances. We refer to Section 4 for a detailed discussion of these results.
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3 2 1 1
3 2 1 1
3 2 1 1
a2 a3
3 2 1 1
a1
3 2 1 1
3 2 1 1
a3
3 2 1 1
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a1 a2a3
Figure 1: Allocation scenario A0 in Example 1.
In the setting considered in this article, an allocation game is defined by a tuple
〈N,G,Ω, val, k〉 comprising a set of agents N and a set of goods G, whose values
are given by the function val mapping each good to a non-negative real number.3 The
function Ω associates each agent with the set of goods he/she is interested in. Moreover,
the natural number k provides the maximum number of goods that can be assigned to
each agent. Each good is indivisible and can be assigned at most to one player.
An allocation scenario over this game is (determined by) a selected set of goods
A ⊆ G that have to be allocated to the agents.
For a coalition of agents C ⊆ N , a (feasible) allocation piCA is a mapping from C
to sets of goods from A such that: each agent i ∈ C gets a set of goods piCA(i) ⊆ Ω(i)
with |piCA(i)| ≤ k, and piCA(i) ∩ piCA(j) = ∅ for any other agent j ∈ C (each good can
be assigned to one agent at most).
With a slight abuse of notation, we denote by val(S) the sum of all the values of a
set of goods S ⊆ G, and by val(piCA) the value of the goods allocated to C, that is, the
goods in
⋃
i∈C pi
C
A(i). An allocation pi
C
A is optimal if there exists no allocation p¯i
C
A with
val(p¯iCA) > val(pi
C
A). The total value of such an optimal allocation for the coalition C
is denoted by optA(C). The budget available for A, also called the (maximum) social
welfare, is optA(N), that is, the value of any optimal allocation for the whole set of
agents N (the grand coalition).
The coalitional game defined by the scenario A is the pair 〈N, optA〉, that is, the
game where the worth of any coalition is given by the value of any of its optimal
allocations (w.r.t. the scenario A). By using solution concepts from coalitional game
theory, it is possible to distribute the available worth to agents an a way that is budget-
balanced and that is perceived as a fair one by agents. Note that optA(C) ≥ 0 holds
for each C ⊆ N , since the allocation where no agent receives any good is a feasible
one (the value of an empty set of goods is 0). The definition trivializes for C = ∅, with
optA(∅) = 0.
Example 1. Consider the allocation game 〈{a1, a2, a3}, {g1, g2, g3, g4},Ω, val, 1〉 and
its scenario with goods A0 = {g1, g2, g3}, depicted in a graphical way in Figure 1,
3For the purpose of this article the setting is slightly simplified with respect to Greco et al. (2015).
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where each edge connects an agent to a good he/she is interested in, and it is possible
to allocate just one good to each agent (k = 1). Note that the good g4, shown in black
in the figure, is not used in the scenarioA0 and thus cannot be assigned to any agent in
allocations based on this selection of goods. The figure shows on the left an allocation
for all the agents (with respect to A0), with the edges in bold identifying the allocation
of goods to agents. Note that this is an optimal allocation, i.e., a feasible allocation
whose sum of values of the allocated goods is the maximum possible one. The value
of this allocation is val(g1) + val(g2) + val(g3) = 3 + 2 + 1 = 6.
The coalitional game associated with this scenario is GA0 = 〈{a1, a2, a3}, vA0〉,
where the worth function vA0 is precisely optA0 . In particular, we have seen that,
for the grand coalition, vA0({a1, a2, a3}) = 6 holds. For each C ⊂ {a1, a2, a3}
with C 6= ∅, an optimal allocation restricted to the agents in C is also reported in
Figure 1. It follows that the other values of the worth function are vA0({a1, a2}) = 5,
vA0({a1, a3}) = vA0({a2, a3}) = 4, vA0({a1}) = vA0({a2}) = 3, and vA0({a3}) =
1. 
3. The Italian VQR modelled as an allocation game
The VQR research assessment exercise for a certain university R can be naturally
modeled as an allocation game 〈R,G, products, val, 2〉 where R is the set of re-
searchers affiliated with R, G is the set of all publications produced by the researchers
in R, products maps authors to the set of publications they have written, and val as-
signs a value to each publication. In the VQR 2011-2014 program, the range of val
was {0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.7, 1}, with the latter value reserved to excellent products.
3.1. Selecting an optimal allocation scenario
In the submission phase, publication values are estimated byR according to the au-
thors’ self-evaluations, and to the reference tables published by ANVUR (only avail-
able for some research areas). Then, R selects for the assessment exercise a set of
publications P ⊆ G such that |P| ≤ 2|R| and there exists a feasible allocation piRP to
allocate these products to its researchers. To maximize its outcome, a structure R may
solve a weighted matching problem and select the P having the maximum possible to-
tal value among all those authored by researchers inR in the considered time frame. At
the end of the program, R receives an amount of funds proportional to VR = val(P),
that is, to the considered measure of the quality of these products.
Example 2. Consider the weighted bipartite graph in Figure 2, whose vertices are the
researchers R = {r1, r2, r3} of a university R and all the publications they have writ-
ten. Edges encode the authorship relation products , and weights encode the mapping
val providing the values of the publications. Consider the optimal allocation ψ such
that ψ(r1) = {p1, p3}, ψ(r2) = {p2, p4}, and ψ(r3) = {p6, p7}, encoded by the solid
lines in the figure. Based on this allocation, an optimal allocation scenario for the eval-
uation is obtained by selecting Pψ = {p1, p2, p3, p4, p6, p7}. The publications that do
not belong to the scenario, i.e., that are not submitted to ANVUR, are shown in black
in the figure.
Note that p2 is co-authored by r1, r2, and r3, while p3 is co-authored by r1 and r2.
The total value of the grand coalition is opt(R) = 45. 
7
7 10 6 7
r3
6 8 7 7
p7
r2r1
p6 p8p5p4p3p2p1
Figure 2: Authors and products in Example 2.
3.2. Division rules
The main issue in allocation problems is to compute, for a given allocation scenario,
a fair distribution of the worth to agents. In particular, for the VQR case, we would
like to compute a fair score for individual researchers, or groups, or departments, and
so on.
Let P be an allocation scenario (the selected products), which is the image of an
(optimal) allocation ψ to all agents in R. In the VQR application, ψ is the formal
association between researchers and products used for the submission to ANVUR.
Definition 1. A division rule γψ (with respect to the allocation ψ) is a real-valued
function that, given an agent r ∈ N , returns its score γψ(r) ≥ 0 with respect to ψ.
By slightly abusing notation, for any coalition S ⊆ R we denote by γψ(S) the
value
∑
r∈S γψ(r). 2
Some examples of division rules. The naive division rule, called proj, assigns to any
agent r the sum of values of the products allocated to her according to ψ, that is,
projψ(r) =
∑
p∈ψ(r)
val(p).
This is the basic division rule used in the VQR to evaluate newly hired personnel
and the substructures. For instance, the VQR evaluation of a department with a set of
researchers S is precisely projψ(S).
The division rule that was used for evaluating PhD committees considers the overall
VQR score that any subset S of agents would achieve if the research structure was
constituted by them only (i.e., without caring about their co-authors outside S and
considering all the products in P):
bestψ(S) = optP(S).
Note that in the extreme case where S = R we just obtain the overall VQR score of
the research structure R.
Another possible division rule described in the literature (Karpov, 2014) and used
in some university, called owner, is based on equal weights co-authorship sharing. This
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division rule assigns to each author the sum of the “normalized” scores of the submitted
products she has co-authored, where by normalization we just mean here dividing the
score of any product p by the cardinality of the set of its authors in R, denoted by
authors(p):
ownerψ(r) =
∑
p∈products(r)∩P
val(p)
|authors(p)| .
Finally, we can use as division rule the Shapley value of the coalitional game
〈R, optP〉, defined by the scenario where the products in P are selected. Let n = |R|
and define the marginal contribution of a set of agents S to a set of agents C as the
difference marg(S,C) = optP(C) − optP(C \ S). Then, this division rule can be
written as follows:
Shapleyψ(r) =
∑
C⊆R\{i}
|C|!(n− |C| − 1)!
n!
marg({i}, C).
Desirable properties of division rules. We next recall the main desirable properties of
any division rule γ for allocation problems. We refer the interested reader to Greco &
Scarcello (2013) for a more detailed description of these properties.
(P1) Budget-balance. The division rule precisely distributes the available worth
over all agents, i.e.,
∑
r∈R γψ(r) = val(P).
(P2) Marginality. For any set of researchers S ⊆ R,∑r∈S γψ(r) ≥ marg(S,R).
That is, every group is granted at least its marginal contribution to the performance of
the grand coalitionR.
(P3) Independence of the specific allocation. The division rule must be inde-
pendent of the specific allocation used for the submission, that is, for any pair of
optimal allocations ψ and ψ¯ over the same allocation scenario P , for each r ∈ R,
γψ(r) = γψ¯(r). This implies that, for each set of agents S, γψ(S) = γψ¯(S) also holds.
(P4) Independence of the selected allocation scenario. The division rule is
indifferent w.r.t. the selected allocation scenario, as long as the selection is any optimal
one: Consider two sets of products P and P¯ such that val(P) = val(P¯) = optG(R).
Then, for every optimal allocation ψ over the scenario P and every optimal allocation
ψ¯ over the scenario P¯ , for each r ∈ R, γψ(r) = γψ¯(r). Note that (P4) clearly entails
(P3). For the VQR application, this means that the worth of any agent does not depend
on the specific (optimal) set of research products submitted to ANVUR.
Greco & Scarcello (2013) describe further properties to guarantee a correct self-
evaluation in the preliminary phase of products selection, such as the “truthfulness”
property: A division rule must provide no incentive in misreporting the score of the
research products.
On the desirability of the Shapley value. We next discuss the properties of the various
division rules mentioned above, in particular with regard to the application to research
quality assessments. Table 1 summarizes the properties enjoyed by the division rules.
All of them satisfy the minimal requirement that guarantees to every agent at least her
marginal contribution to the grand coalition (property P2). However, the division rules
behave quite differently with respect to the other properties.
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proj best owner Shapley
(P1) budget-balance    
(P2) marginality    
(P3) independence of the allocation    
(P4) independence of the allocation scenario    
Table 1: Summary of desiderable properties of division rules.
Note that the basic proj division rule is trivially budget-balanced (Property P1).
However it fails to satisfy property P3 (and hence P4), because it is completely based
on the specific allocation used for submitting the products to the ANVUR agency. This
means that this rule is definitely not adequate for evaluating single researchers, as well
as groups of researchers and substructures. Indeed, the optimal allocations are chosen
to maximize (only) the social welfare for the structureR, regardless of what happens to
groups and researchers. Consider for instance Example 2, with the allocation scenario
and its allocation ψ depicted in Figure 2, where projψ(r1) = 13 and projψ(r2) = 17.
Then, consider an alternative allocation ψ′ over the same scenario where agents r1
and r2 exchange their goods p2 and p3. In this case, nothing changes for the univer-
sity, but the worth of these researchers is quite different, since projψ′(r1) = 17 and
projψ′(r2) = 13.
Contrasted with the previous notion, best does not depend on the specific alloca-
tion (a new optimal allocation is computed for each set of agents to be considered), so
that it satisfies P3 and, from the results in Greco & Scarcello (2014), it can be shown
that it satisfies P4, too. For this reason, we simplify the notation and do not report
the allocation (i.e., we just write best rather than bestψ). We do the same for the
subsequent division rules, which are independent of the allocation, too.
Note however that the division rule best is not budget-balanced, because it would
distribute more resources than those that are actually available. In the same Example 2,
we have best(r1) = 17, best(r2) = 17, and best(r3) = 18, which means that
we would need a total worth 52, while only 45 = val(P) is available. Besides the
fact that it is not budget-balanced, if used for single researchers or small groups, this
division rule clearly advantages those researchers whose research products have many
co-authors, because each of them can independently use her best products. As a matter
of fact, using this notion means getting rid of the main constraint of the VQR procedure,
which states that the same product cannot be used simultaneously by more authors.
The division rule owner is instead budget-balanced and satisfies property P3, be-
cause for each agent all its products available in the allocation scenario are considered,
regardless of the specific allocation used in the submission phase to ANVUR. How-
ever even this division rule is perceived as an unfair one, because it does not satisfy
marginality and because it is sensitive to the different possible selection of products,
that is, it strongly depends on the specific allocation scenario that has been chosen.
As far as marginality is concerned, consider the coalition {r1, r2} and note that
marg({r1, r2}, {r1, r2, r3}) = 45 − 18 = 27. However, owner(r1) = owner(r2) =
7 + 10/3 + 6/2, so that the overall worth of this coalition is 80/3, which is 1/3 less
than its marginal contribution to the grand-coalition. Therefore, owner does not satisfy
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Figure 3: An alternative allocation scenario for authors and products in Example 2.
the basic requirement P2.
Concering Property P4, consider the alternative allocation scenario based on the
products P ′ = {p1, p2, p4, p5, p6, p7}, depicted in Figure 3. The figure also shows a
possible optimal allocation ψ′′ that gives the same (maximum) social welfare 45 for the
grand-coalition. Now focus on agent r2: by using the former allocation scenario P , we
get owner(r2) = 10/3 + 6/2 + 7 = 40/3; by using the alternative allocation scenario
P ′, r2 increases her worth of the quantity 3, since we get owner(r2) = 10/3+7+6 =
49/3. Indeed, in the latter case the scenario comprises the product p5 that is authored
only by r2, instead of p3 that r1 and r2 have in common. On the other hand, with
the allocation scenario P ′, r1 loses a quantity 6/2, which came from her share in the
product p3 /∈ P ′.
Therefore, owner fails to satisfy property P4, which we sometimes call the fairness
property, because it is the very property that legitimates university R to freely look
for any optimal selection of the research products, without caring about the personal
and usually contrasting preferences of groups and researchers. Indeed, we have seen
that, without property P4, the choice of a specific optimal set of products may lead to
quite different scores. This is true not only for individuals but even for their aggre-
gations: think, e.g., of researchers r1 and r2 belonging to different departments, and
assume these departments compete with each other (or even with departments from
other universities) for some funds depending on the VQR outcome.
We remark that other elementary division rules that do not depend on the specific
allocation have the same problem, too. For instance, consider the alternative division
rule average, which is based on the average value of all products authored by an agent
in the considered scenario. It can be checked easily that this division rule does not meet
property P4, either. For instance, contrasting the scenario P ′ with the scenario P , the
average value for r1 is modified by the selection in the latter scenario of the product
p3, which reduces its average value from 17/2 to 23/3.
Moreover, observe that it is unfeasible to consider division rules that possibly take
into account products outside the allocation scenario. Indeed, products outside the sce-
nario are not part of any allocation and cannot be used. Think of the VQR application:
these products have not been submitted to ANVUR and hence none of them has actu-
ally been evaluated by the committee. Therefore, none of them has a final, validated
and official VQR value.
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On the other hand, it has been shown that the division rule Shapley satisfies all
the considered properties (and even more) Greco & Scarcello (2013): it is well known
that the Shapley value is a budget-balanced notion and it is clearly independent of the
specific allocation; moreover, in Greco & Scarcello (2014) it is proved that it is inde-
pendent of the selection of the products in the scenario, and that satisfies marginality
(because it is in the core of the “dual” coalitional game 〈R,marg(·,R)〉). Unlike the
above proposals, the worth of any agent is computed by considering the marginal con-
tributions of all the possible coalitions she may join, and then by taking the weighted
average of these contributions (where the weight depends on the cardinality of each
coalition, precisely on the number of permutations of agents in C and in its comple-
ment). In the subsequent sections, we face the problem of computing this allocation,
and discuss the differences with the division rules used for the VQR by ANVUR, by
considering the actual values in our case study at Sapienza University of Rome.
Because the notion is both independent of the scenario and of the allocation, we
next denote Shapleyψ(r) simply by φr, as it is usual in game theory.
4. Computational issues and how to deal with them
Computing the Shapley value is a #P-hard problem for many classes of games (see,
e.g., Aziz & de Keijzer (2014); Bachrach & Rosenschein (2009); Deng & Papadim-
itriou (1994); Nagamochi et al. (1997)), including allocation games, even if goods may
have only two possible values Greco & Scarcello (2014). In our application scenario,
where agents are researchers and goods are research products, for large universities we
may have to deal with thousands of agents and goods. The brute-force approach to the
Shapley value would need to solve, for each agent i ∈ N , 2|N | optimization problems,
which is clearly infeasible for our test cases.
In order to mitigate the complexity of this problem, various input simplification
techniques and approximation algorithms have been proposed and experimentally tested
(see, e.g., Liben-Nowell et al. (2012); Maleki et al. (2013); Lupia et al. (2018)): we
summarize them in the remainder of this section.
4.1. Input instance simplification
Several properties have been outlined in Lupia et al. (2018), which may be useful in
simplifying allocation games without altering the Shapley value of the involved play-
ers. First, it has been proven that each connected component of the agents graph can
be treated as a separate coalitional game. Next, it has been shown that goods having
value 0 may safely be removed from the game (these goods, while not impacting on
the computation of the optimal allocation, induce connections among agents that com-
plicate the structure of the input graph). A third property states that, for any coalition
Z ⊆ N such that opt(Z) + opt(N \ Z) ≤ opt(N), the Shapley value may be cal-
culated separately for subsets Z and N \ Z. Intuitively, this means that any subset of
agents Z that do not exhibit an effective synergy with the rest, can be removed from
the game and their Shapley value computed independently. Finally, a mathematical
condition has been given to identify goods that are provably useless for some agents.
Edges between goods and agents that do not need them may be safely dropped without
altering the Shapley value.
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4.2. Approximating the Shapley value
In order to approximate the Shapley value, one possibility is to use the fully poly-
nomial randomized approximation scheme (FPRAS) described in Liben-Nowell et al.
(2012). An alternative, when a range for the marginal contribution of each agent is
known, is provided by the sampling method presented in Maleki et al. (2013). We will
now briefly discuss both approaches.
FPRAS for supermodular and monotone coalitional games. As stated in Liben-Nowell
et al. (2012), it is possible to compute, in polynomial-time, an −approximation of
the Shapley value, with probability of failure at most δ, for supermodular and mono-
tone coalitional games (it can be shown that our allocation games are indeed of this
type Greco & Scarcello (2014)).
The method is based on generating a certain number of permutations (of all agents)
and computing the marginal contribution of each agent to the coalition of agents occur-
ring before her in the considered permutation. Then the Shapley value of each player
is computed as the average of all such marginal contributions. The above procedure
(see Figure 4 for detailed pseudo-code) is repeated O(log(1/δ)) times, in independent
runs, with the result for each agent consisting of the median of all computed values for
her. Finally, the obtained values are scaled (i.e., they are all multiplied by a common
numerical factor) to ensure that the budget-balance property is not violated. Clearly,
the more permutations are considered, the closer to the Shapley value the result will be,
the relation between the number m of required random permutations in each run and 
being m = 4n(n− 1)/2, where n is the number of agents.
The algorithm runs in O(m× n×margComp) time, where margComp denotes
the cost of computing each marginal contribution. This requires the computation of
an optimal weighted matching in a bipartite graph, which is feasible in O(n3), via the
classical Hungarian algorithm Kuhn (1955).
Sampling algorithm when the range of marginal contributions is known. Maleki et al.
(2013) propose a bound, based on Hoeffding’s inequality Hoeffding (1963), on the
samples required to estimate an agent’s Shapley value, when the range of his/her con-
tributions is known. They prove that, in order to approximate the Shapley value of
agent i within an absolute value abs with probability larger than 1 − δi, i.e., in order
to get
Prob{|φ˜i − φi| ≥ abs} ≤ δi (1)
at least mi samples are required, where:
mi =
⌈
ln ( 2δi ) · r2i
2 · 2abs
⌉
(2)
In the above expression, ri denotes the range of i’s marginal contributions (i.e., ri =
opt({i})−marg({i}, N)), where N is the set of agents that partecipate in the alloca-
tion game).
Given this bound, once abs and δi are fixed, it is possible determine the number of
required random samples for each agent i. Assuming an overall failure probability δ is
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Input: An allocation game GA = 〈N, vA〉;
Parameters: Real number 0 <  < 1;
Output: A vector φ˜ that is an approximation of the Shapley value of GA;
1: m = 4·|N |·(|N |−1)2 ;
2: i = 0;
3: φ˜ = [0];
4: while i < m do
5: shuffle(N);
6: C := {∅};
7: for all j ∈ N do
8: φ˜j += vA(C ∪ {j})− vA(C);
9: C := C ∪ {j};
10: i = i+ 1;
11: end for
12: end while
13: for all j ∈ N do
14: φ˜j =
φ˜j
m ;
15: end for
16: return φ˜;
Figure 4: FPRAS core procedure.
desired, each agent i ∈ N could be assigned a failure probability δi = δ/|N |. Alter-
natively, a higher failure probability could be tolerated for agents with larger ranges, at
the expense of a lower one for agents with smaller ranges.
Once the number of required samples for each agent has been computed, the ap-
proximate Shapley value, with the desired guarantees, can easily be computed by a
randomized sampling algorithm, such as the one shown in Figure 4.
4.3. Lower and upper bounds for the Shapley value
In Lupia et al. (2018), techniques are introduced for the computation of lower and
upper bounds for the Shapley value. The availability of such bounds can be helpful
to provide a more accurate estimation of the approximation error in randomized al-
gorithms. Besides, whenever the two bounds coincide for some agent, we clearly get
the precise Shapley value for that agent. Furthermore, in some applications, when the
Shapley value cannot be computed exactly, one may be more interested in a guaran-
teed interval, rather than one probably good point, as it is yielded by approximation
algorithms.
Trivially, for each agent i in our monotone allocation games, his/her Shapley value
will be in the interval between i’s marginal contribution to the grand coalition, and i’s
optimal allocation. To obtain tighter bounds, Lupia et al. observe that the neighbors of i
in a coalitionC are the agents having the highest influence on the marginal contribution
of i toC. Indeed, they are precisely those agents interested in using the goods of iwhen
he/she does not belong to the coalition. On the other hand, in the extreme case that no
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neighbors are present, i contributes with all her/his best goods. The idea is to consider
the power-set of Neigh(i) as the only relevant sets of agents, and assign upper and
lower bounds to the marginal contribution of i to a coalition C as a function only of
C∩Neigh(i). A detailed algorithm is provided in Lupia et al. (2018), where it is shown
that, for each element of the power set of Neigh(i), only a constant number of optimal
allocations have to be computed, leading to an O(2|Neigh(i)||N |3) running time.
4.4. Experimental results
Lupia et al. (2018) report an experimental study concerning the feasibility of com-
puting the Shapley value for the researchers of Sapienza University of Rome (one of
the largest universities in Europe) who participated in the most recent Italian research
assessment exercise (namely, VQR2011-2014). We will now briefly summarize those
results.
Parallel implementations of the algorithms described above were run on a machine
equipped with two Intel Xeon E5-4610 v2 @ 2.30GHz with 8 cores and 16 logical
processors each, for a total of 32 logical processors, 128 GB of RAM, and operating
system Linux Debian Wheezy. The code was written in Java and run on the Open-
JDK Runtime Environment (IcedTea 2.6.7). The input instance consisted of 3562
researchers and 5909 research products. The scores for the research products were
computed by applying, when available, the bibliographic assessment tables provided
by ANVUR.
The dataset described above was preliminarily simplified by applying the results
outlined in Section 4.1. After the whole preprocessing phase, a total of 159 connected
components (CCs henceforth) were obtained, with the largest one containing 685 au-
thors, and all others having size at most 15. All components in the simplified graph,
except for the largest one, could be completely solved by an exponential running time,
exact Shapley value algorithm, in a matter of seconds. However, it was estimated that
even the parallel implementation of the FPRAS method, in spite of its high efficiency
when compared to the exact algorithm, would have taken, with  = 0.05 and δ = 0.01,
roughly 3.33 years to fully analyze the largest CC.
The approach provided by Maleki et al. proved much more efficient than the FPRAS
method, at least for the case study considered, in which the range of marginal contri-
butions for each agent is fairly limited. In its standard form, the algorithm by Maleki
et al. guarantees an absolute error relative to the Shapley value (see eq. (1) in Sec-
tion 4.2), as opposed to the FPRAS method, where  represents a percentage relative to
the correct value. Computing the Shapley value of all authors in the largest CC of the
simplified graph, with 99% probability within an absolute error abs = 5, took approx-
imately 5.5 hours on the considered experimental platform, while the same calculation
on the largest CC in the unsimplified graph took approximately 20 hours.
In order to consider, for the Maleki-based algorithm, the classical percentage ex-
pression for the approximation error, as opposed to the absolute error provided by its
standard form, abs should be replaced by  ·φi in eq. (1). First observe that, in the case
of the simplified graph, it will be φi 6= 0 for any agents i considered by the algorithm,
as the simplification techniques preliminarily identify and remove from the game all
agents having Shapley value equal to 0 (these agents will be interested only in goods
with value 0). In fact, the value of φi that would appear in eq. (2) may be replaced
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Figure 5: Sapienza Coautorship graph.
by any known (positive) lower bound `i ≤ φi, at the expense of taking more samples
than strictly necessary. For the largest CC of the simplified VQR2011-2014 graph, a
parallel implementation of the techniques described in Section 4.3 allowed Lupia et
al. to compute lower bounds for all agents in approximately 160 hours. These in turn
allowed the Maleki-based algorithm to approximate the Shapley value of all agents,
with 99% probability within 5% of the correct value, in approximately 12 hours.
5. Using Shapley values for publication credit allocation in VQR 2011-2014
In the previous section, we have summarized a number of technical results that
allow for the computation of an approximation of the Shapley value, even for large
instances including thousands of researchers and publications. As shown in Lupia
et al. (2018), by using the simplification and approximation techniques described in
Section 4, it is possible to solve the publication credit allocation problem for large
instances using the Shapley value.
We wish to point out that the Sapienza test case is not only a large instance of a
publication credit allocation problem, comprising 3562 researchers and 5909 research
products, but it is also a complex one, due to the very high number of collaborations
among Sapienza researchers. In Figure 5, we show the complex interaction of Sapienza
researchers, where each node represents a Sapienza researcher and an arc denotes the
existence of a coauthored article (among the set of articles selected by Sapienza for the
VQR evaluation). As you can see, the graph has an extremely dense core, thus making
the credit allocation problem very difficult to solve.
Unfortunately, we do not have access to the individual scores assigned by ANVUR
to the submitted articles, but at least for the scientific areas that adopted a bibliometric
assessment of the publications, we have been able to estimate the score of most of the
submitted papers. Therefore, from now on, we will only concentrate on the authors and
publications whose scores we could reasonably estimate. Moreover, we excluded the
authors that refused to partecipate to the VQR (over 300 researchers and professors of
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Sapienza joined a boycott of the VQR, one of the largest percentages in Italy). After
this simplification, the remaining set of researchers and professors is composed of 2346
individuals who contributed 4638 articles. Notice that the simplification does not really
decrease the complexity of the problem, since (almost) all of the excluded persons do
not belong to the tightly connected core shown in Figure 5.
In order to assess the improvement in the fairness of the credit allocation using
the Shapley value we compare, at the level of individuals, scientific fields (SSDs) and
departments, the rankings currently used by ANVUR for different purposes and the
rankings based on the Shapley value, namely, we consider the following division rules:
1. proj, also called “the VQR score”;
2. Best;
3. Shapley.
We do not provide a comparison with the owner allocation because this allocation
rule, due to the very limited number of papers submitted to (and evaluated by) AN-
VUR, would greatly penalize authors with large sets of coauthors. In order to make the
scores more easily comparable, ANVUR published the average score for every SSD in
its VQR2011-2014 report4 and the average score for every SSD using the “Best” as-
signment5. In the sequel, following the ANVUR approach, we will compare the ratio
of the individual scores to the average score of the SSD the reasercher belongs to (AN-
VUR calls it the R indicator). The VQR score and the Shapley value will be normalized
using the average score, while the “Best” assignment will be normalized by using the
average score for every SSD using the ”Best” assignment. More precisely, given the
allocation ψ used for the submission to ANVUR, we compute, for every researcher r,
• RVQR(r), as the ratio between projψ(r) and the average score of her SSD mul-
tiplied by the number of assigned publications;
• RShapley(r), as the ratio between φr and the average score of her SSD multiplied
by the number of assigned publications;
• RBest(r), as the ratio between Best(r) and the average score of her SSD using
the ”Best” assignment multiplied by the number of assigned publications.
To summarize our results, we computed for every researcher the discrepancy be-
tween RVQR and RShapley , and the discrepancy between RBest and RShapley . More
precisely, we define the percentual discrepancy between RVQR and RShapley as fol-
lows:
RVQR(r)−RShapley(r)
RShapley(r)
· 100
4Available here (in both English and Italian) http://www.anvur.org/index.php?option=
com_content&view=article&id=1206:vqr&catid=2:non-categorizzato&lang=it&
Itemid=789
5Available here (in Italian only) http://www.anvur.org/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=455&Itemid=481&lang=it
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Figure 6: Number of researchers with at least a given percentage discrepancy betweenRVQR andRShapley
(absolute value).
Analogously, the percentual the discrepancy between RBest and RShapley is defined as
follows:
RBest(r)−RShapley(r)
RShapley(r)
· 100
Figure 6 shows, for each absolute value v of discrepancy between RVQR and
RShapley , the number of researchers having discrepancy at least v. Moreover, the
figure shows the median and the main percentiles evaluated over the population of
the 1022 researchers having a discrepancy different than zero. Note that half of these
researchers exhibits an absolute value discrepancy of at least 20% and there are 124
researchers with a discrepancy above 100%. See Figure 7, for a quick view of some
notable ranges of (absolute value) discrepancy.
Table 2 reports also the discrepancies between RVQR and RShapley at SSD and at
department level, and provides also positive and negative discrepancies, besides their
absolute values (frequencies are cumulative, e.g., the number of researchers with dis-
crepancies of 5% or higher also includes those with discrepancies of 10% or higher,
and so forth).
At the scientific discipline level (SSD), 5 SSDs have a positive discrepancy of
over 20%. Things are better at the department level (discrepancies tend to compen-
sate within departments), but there is at least one department that has a discrepancy of
over 15%. It is evident that the VQR assignment is not always a good indicator of the
performances of departments, scientific disciplines, and individuals. Nevertheless, it
has been used both for compiling a ranking of all departments, and for assigning sig-
nificant funds through the “Excellent Departments” program. Notice that the ranking
used in this funding program is highly sensitive to small changes in RVQR A depart-
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Figure 7: Number of researchers with ranges of absolute value discrepancies betweenRVQR andRShapley .
Researchers SSDs Departments
Total 2347 181 57
discr ≥ 100% 56 0 0
discr ≥ 50% 115 0 0
discr ≥ 20% 284 2 0
discr ≥ 15% 319 2 1
discr ≥ 10% 380 6 1
discr ≥ 5% 500 14 1
discr ≤ −100% 68 0 0
discr ≤ −50% 112 0 0
discr ≤ −20% 245 3 0
discr ≤ −15% 277 4 0
discr ≤ −10% 323 7 0
discr ≤ −5% 406 20 2
|discr| ≥ 100% 124 0 0
|discr| ≥ 50% 227 0 0
|discr| ≥ 20% 529 5 0
|discr| ≥ 15% 596 6 1
|discr| ≥ 10% 703 13 1
|discr| ≥ 5% 906 34 3
Table 2: Discrepancies between RVQR and RShapley .
ment may lose some millions of euros because of a difference of a few decimals in its
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Researchers SSDs Departments
Total 2347 181 57
discr ≥ 100% 42 0 0
discr ≥ 50% 191 4 0
discr ≥ 20% 388 7 0
discr ≥ 15% 458 12 1
discr ≥ 10% 538 22 1
discr ≥ 5% 614 43 1
discr ≤ −100% 0 0 0
discr ≤ −50% 0 0 0
discr ≤ −20% 8 3 0
discr ≤ −15% 91 4 0
discr ≤ −10% 426 18 0
discr ≤ −5% 914 42 2
|discr| ≥ 100% 42 0 0
|discr| ≥ 50% 191 4 0
|discr| ≥ 20% 396 10 0
|discr| ≥ 15% 549 16 1
|discr| ≥ 10% 964 40 1
|discr| ≥ 5% 1573 85 3
Table 3: Discrepancies between RBest and RShapley .
evaluation.6.
ANVUR is aware of the limitations of RVQR to assess individuals and, in order to
overcome these limitations, it proposed the use of RBest to evaluate smaller groups,
such as PhD committees. However, as we show in Table 3, the discrepancies between
RBest and RShapley are even higher than those between RVQR and RShapley .
The disadvantages of RBest are the following:
• It penalizes top performers. Everyone who obtained the top scores has an RBest
that is lower than RVQR, since the numerator cannot improve but the denomina-
tor gets larger.
• It favors researchers who work in larger groups with respect to researchers who
work in smaller groups. Since these results have been used to distribute fund-
ing among the universities and departments, the effect is to make large groups
stronger and small ones weaker. In the long run, such a policy would force all de-
partments to concentrate all researchers in large groups working in few research
areas, thus reducing the breadth of the research areas.
6Details (in Italian only) can be found here http://hubmiur.
pubblica.istruzione.it/alfresco/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/
a8a56378-d9f4-44cd-b0dd-7bce0d2f1b7d/Nota_metodologica_ISPD_ANVUR.pdf
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As we already mentioned, the VQR scores have been used in a number of addi-
tional assessments. We briefly discuss the impact of the reported discrepancies on the
assessments of PhD committees and the selection and ranking of departments of excel-
lence.
1. PhD committees: the ANVUR guidelines dictated, among other requirements,
that the member of PhD committees had values of the indicator RBest ≥ 1.
Since the computation is done at the level of single members of the committees,
we argue that the error introduced by the use of RBest instead of RShapley is
rather significant.
2. Departments of excellence: the ranking computed by the Ministry of Education,
Universities, and Research (MIUR) compared the performance of each depart-
ment with respect to a “Virtual Department” with the same composition, but
where all the products of the researchers obtain the average value of the SSD to
which they belong. Moreover, the individual RVQR was divided by the variance
of the distribution of scores in the corresponding SSD. Since in many SSDs, vari-
ances can be quite small, the normalization actually corresponds to a multiplier
that also increases the error in the indicator, thus multiplying the discrepancy.
6. Related work
In Section 6.1, we address various schemes related to the Shapley value, discussing
their features in the context of coauthorship analysis. We also put our contributions into
perspective by considering related work on the current and previous Italian research
assessment exercises in Section 6.2.
6.1. Shapley value-related articles
Papapetrou et al. (2011) approximate the Shapley value by considering not all sub-
sets of authors, but only those including only authors who have actually coauthored at
least one publication. Whenever a value for v(S ∪ i) is known (where S is a coalition
and i is an author not in S), if a value for v(S) is not known (i.e., there is not even a sin-
gle publication with author set S), it is composed from subsets. This procedure leads
to an iterative algorithm, which does not provide any theoretical guarantees that the ob-
tained scores satisfy any of the fairness properties enjoyed by the exact Shapley value.
However, the authors argue, and experimentally demonstrate, that their approximation
yields fairer results than a simple approach based on the equal division of publication
scores among coauthors.
Tol (2012) computes a pseudo-Shapley value taking into account not all possible
coalitions, but only the coalitions that correspond to existing research institutions (the
article focuses on business schools in Ireland). The value of a coalition is defined as
either the average number of publications by the authors in it, or the average number
of citations obtained by publications coauthored by the authors in it. Tol divides his
pseudo-Shapley value into two terms, one representing the contribution of an author
to her institution (a measure of her “power” over the institution), and the other repre-
senting her contribution to the other institutions (i.e., a measure of her “market value”).
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Rankings, of both authors and institutions, based on these measures are either identical,
or very similar, to those obtained using more conventional performance indicators, at
least for the considered test cases. Insights into the robustness (or fragility) of insti-
tutions’ ranks may be gained from the power measures of their authors. It should be
noted that, analogously to the approach by Papapetrou et al., also in this case there are
no theoretical guarantees that the obtained scores satisfy any of the fairness properties
enjoyed by the exact Shapley value.
Karpov (2014) proves the equivalence of owner and the Shapley value, for specific
forms of the characteristic function v that describes the cooperative game. Recall that
owner is based on equal weights coauthorship sharing, and simply divides equally be-
tween coauthors the score of each publication. The score of each author i, according to
this division rule, can be computed in polynomial time. Following Karpov’s notation,
it can be written as
yi =
m∑
j=1
1i∈Sj
|Sj | · qj
where qj and Sj are, respectively, the score and the set of coauthors of publication
j, m is the total number of publications, and 1i∈Sj = 1 if i ∈ Sj and 1i∈Sj = 0
otherwise. Karpov proves that yi coincides with the Shapley value of author i, as long
as the characteristic function v, used to compute it, takes one of the following three
forms:
v1(S) =
m∑
j=1
1Sj⊆S · qj (full obligation game)
v2(S) =
m∑
j=1
1Sj∩S 6=∅ · qj (full credit game)
v3(S) =
∑
i∈S
m∑
j=1
1i∈Sj
|Sj | · qj (equal weights game)
where S denotes any subset (coalition) of authors. In the full obligation game, a pub-
lication’s score is added to the coalition score only if all its coauthors are members of
the coalition. In the full credit game, each publication score is added possibly multi-
ple times, once for every coauthor present in the coalition. In the equal weights game,
each coauthor is assigned an equal portion of the publication’s score, and only the score
fractions of coauthors in the coalition are added. We note that, as sensible as the above
criteria might appear, none of them reflects the operations that each Italian research
institution should perform, according to VQR rules, in order to compute an optimal
assignment of research products to its staff members. Moreover, we have shown in
Section 3 that this division rule is unfair, as far as the research evaluation process is
concerned, because it does not satisfy the marginality property and because it depends
on the specific set of (optimal) products submitted for the evaluation.
6.2. Italian research assessment exercises-related articles
Franceschini & Maisano (2017) present a structured discussion of VQR 2011-2014,
collecting several critical remarks, and developing them in detail. Identified method-
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ological vulnerabilities include the following. (1) The number of products evaluated
for each researcher is too small to allow identification of the level of excellence, or even
the average quality of research institutions. It is argued that all that can be identified
are the less virtuous institutions. (2) The use of journal metrics to evaluate individ-
ual articles can be misleading, as the variability in the number of citations received by
articles published in the same journal is generally high. (3) VQR 2011-2014 normal-
izes citational data and journal impact factors using percentile ranks (per year and per
area of research) and then combines them in a weighted sum. It is argued that such a
combination of only apparently compatible indicators may lead to rank distortions. (4)
Several “calibration” operations, relative to the bibliometric evaluation procedures (for
example, choosing relative weights for citation counts and journal impact factors), are
entrusted to panels of experts nominated for each research area. It is suggested that, in
the absence of solid guidelines, this additional degree of freedom may be counterpro-
ductive. (5) VQR 2011-2014 uses a hybrid approach based both on peer review and on
blibliometric evaluation. It is assumed that such evaluations are mutually compatible,
an assumption that does not seem to be supported by adequate empirical evidence.
Point (3) of the above list is also addressed in Abramo & D’Angelo (2016), where
it is argued that the combination of citational data and journal metrics in VQR 2011-
2014 is not justified on the basis of current scientific literature, and that a simple citation
count mechanism would have yielded a better prediction on the long term impact of a
publication (and therefore a more accurate score), beginning from a citation window of
at least two years.
Methodological objections have also been raised in the context of VQR 2004-2010,
some related to those concerning VQR 2011-2014, which is hardly surprising, given
the similarities between the two evaluation exercises (see Section 2.1). In particular,
Abramo & D’Angelo (2015) identify limits of the bibliometric criteria employed for
hard sciences in VQR 2004-2010, including the following. (1) The use of journal
metrics as an indication of a publication’s impact; the authors argue that citation counts
are much more reliable indicators, except for very short citation windows. (2) The
failure to consider product quality scores as a continuous range, as the introduction of
discrete classes, along with value caps, may have led to the same overall evaluation
for publications with quite different bibliometric indicators. (3) The full counting of a
publication’s score, regardless of the number of coauthors. (4) The limited number of
products evaluated.
Rebora & Turri (2013) focus on the way in which research evaluation exercises in
the UK and Italy have been acknowledged by universities, the changes that they have
undergone over time, and the kind of public debate which accompanied these changes.
The authors argue that British RAE (Research Assessment Exercise) has influenced
the development of research in the UK by favoring mono-disciplinary publications
over multi-disciplinary ones. At the same time, however, it is generally acknowledged
that RAE gave a positive contribution to research in the UK, as it is reflected in world
university rankings. The most notable change from RAE to its successor REF (Re-
search Excellence Framework), which, very much like its predecessor, is based on peer
review, is an attempt to evaluate not only research quality, but also its impact on econ-
omy, society and culture. Italy’s first research assessment exercise, VTR 2001-2003,
which was conducted 15 years later than the earliest RAE, was inspired by it. Its suc-
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cessor, VQR 2004-2010, diverged instead from its British counterpart due to the use of
bibliometric indicators for many scientific areas. The authors claim that, compared to
the UK, research assessment exercises in Italy were characterized by less debate and a
more passive reception. They also note that, differently from the British case, resource
allocation for universities, in the years that followed VTR 2001-2003, was determined
by a complex algorithm in which the relevance of the assessment itself was reduced,
as a large number of other indicators were considered as well. It is also observed that
the decision, in VQR 2004-2010, to make wide use of citation data for the scientific
areas subject to bibliometric evaluation, and its effects at the micro (i.e., individual)
level have not been the subject of in-depth and shared discussions.
7. Conclusions and future work
While the primary goal of national research assessment exercises remains the evalu-
ation of structures (e.g., universities) and substructures (e.g., departments), their results
may also be used for other assessments that more directly involve individuals. This has
been the case for Italy’s most recent research assessment effort, namely VQR 2011-
2014, whose data have been used for the evaluation of members of PhD committees as
well as for the determination of the so called “departments of excellence”. These uses
of VQR data, however, require that credit allocation for the submitted research products
be done in a fair way. Unfortunately, the way credit allocation is currently performed
by ANVUR (the national agency entrusted with VQR execution) yields evaluations
that do not satisfy properties that, from a methodological perspective, are highly de-
sirable. We have pointed out that, due to recent algorithmic advances, it is possible
to compute reasonably good approximations for the Shapley value (a game-theoretic
solution concept for the credit allocation problem that enjoys several “fairness” proper-
ties) of individual authors, even for large input instances. We have presented a detailed
comparison of the scores assigned by the official VQR rules to individual researchers,
research groups and departments belonging to Sapienza University of Rome (one of the
largest universities in Italy), with those resulting from our Shapley value computations.
Significant discrepancies have emerged at both the individual level and at the level of
scientific disciplinary sectors, while score variations seem to more or less compensate
within departments, albeit with some exceptions.
As detailed in Section 4.4, our results are based on the exact Shapley value for the
vast majority of researchers (2877 out of 3562), while for the remaining 685 (19.23%
of the total) we were able to compute quite good approximations (i.e., within 5% of the
correct value with 99% probability) in roughly 172 hours. We are currently working
on identifying further theoretical properties of the Shapley value in allocation games,
with the aim of developing more sophisticated tools for simplifying real-world VQR
instances, and consequently being able to compute the exact Shapley value for all re-
searchers.
Our input preprocessing and approximation techniques can be applied to other in-
stances of VQR 2011-2014, referring to different universities, or even to other types
of research institutions, assuming that the relevant data were available. This paves the
way for an interesting comparative study.
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Our techniques can also be applied to previous research evaluation exercises (e.g.,
VQR 2004-2010), even though with some caveats (the number of required products
per researcher was larger in VQR 2004-2010, leading to more complex instances, and
negative scores were also used, e.g., for missing products, implying slight differences
in how this research evaluation exercise should be modeled as an allocation game).
This could provide unique insights on how, over the years, evaluation efforts have
contributed changing the way scientific research is conducted in Italy.
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